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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the intersection of corruption and education by analyzing the potential effects 
corruption has on the educational attainment of public primary and secondary school students in 
Brazil. I approach the discussion from a human rights perspective and outline the right to education as 
a duplicative right, or a right that once secured more easily facilitates access to securing other rights. I 
examine the potential effects of corruption by analyzing educational fund leakage scandals in four 
Brazilian states that vary in Human Development Index, racial marginalization, and wealth. By 
exploiting data from the Brazilian Ministry of Education in municipalities where rampant corruption 
occurred (or occurs), I find a strong negative association between leakages and decreased educational 
attainment. From this finding, I analyze the effects of decreased educational attainment for racially 
marginalized students and argue that corruption in public schools is likely to lead to increased racial 
inequality, decreased ability for public students to matriculate into university, and decreased 
employment opportunities. The negative effects motivate discussion for transparency and 
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PART I) INTRODUCTION  
 
It is estimated that the seven countries that spend the most on education worldwide invest over 
$1 trillion USD on public education services a year.1 After health services, education is one of the 
largest government expenditures, and with good reason, too (Hallak and Poisson, 13-14). Education is 
vital. It not only allows children to develop skills that help realize their full human potential, but it also 
can lift the disadvantaged out of poverty to secure a more promising, economically prosperous future. 
Government education reforms frequently target how more money could optimize educational 
attainment (Hedges, Laine, and Greenwald, 1994). Such reforms, however, are contingent on funding 
actually reaching the intended beneficiaries (Wenglinsky, 1998). Cross-national evidence shows that 
this is far from the case. Work Bank researchers Bruns, Filmer and Patrinos (2011) demonstrate that in 
multiple developing countries, roughly 30% of total funds never reach schools. Mismanagement, 
inefficiency, and lack of financial expertise are some potential causes of fund leakages. Corruption is 
another.  
 
Corruption is widely regarded as a pervasive societal problem with a multitude of negative 
consequences (Gardiner, 2002). The study of corruption has been examined from various perspectives, 
including analysis of societal perceptions of corruption (Allison and Canache, 2005), the psychological 
effects of living in corrupt societies (Bayley, 1966), how corrupted entities and organizations function 
(Frits, Leana, and Pinto, 2008), and/or what motivates individuals to act corruptly (Ibid). Recently, 
practitioners and academics alike have begun to analyze the relationship between human rights and 
corruption (Ibid 249-250). This thesis seeks to examine this relationship further by focusing on how 
corruption can negatively impact the ability of children to secure their right to education. From a 
human rights perspective, emphasis is on the tangible negative consequences corruption has on 
children, thus situating children as victims to corruption.  
 
Corruption in education is often damning because it hurts one of the world’s most vulnerable 
groups—children (Hallak and Poisson, 2011). This is common in Brazil, where education fund 
leakages are rampant. Mid-2000’s estimates calculate that anywhere from 13-55% of all Brazilian 
                                                
1 The countries are (in order per % of gross domestic product): Denmark, Iceland, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, 
Israel, and the United States.  
2 Transparency International is an international non-governmental organization that monitors corruption worldwide.  
3 Teacher neglect of school obligations is known as teacher absenteeism. See Part III, § 4 for further definition and 
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educational funds were lost due to fund leakages (Bruns, Evans, and Laque, 2012, 97). The focus of 
this thesis will be on corruption in education in Brazil; however, corrupt practices in education are 
reflective of a broader problem in Brazilian society (Geddes and Neto, 1992). At the national level, the 
country faces a multi-billion dollar corruption scandal with state-owned oil company, Petrobras. 
Investigations brought upon by Operation Car Wash (Operação Lava Jato) have yielded high-level 
arrests of businessmen and politicians, including potential impeachment charges of the president 
herself. The magnitude of corruption within Brazil is worsened by the estimated 2 billion USD of 
embezzled funds connected to the FIFA 2012 World Cup (Pressly, 2010). From the education sector to 
state-owned companies and mega-events, Brazil is no stranger to corruption. In this thesis, I focus on 
corruption in the Brazilian public education system and answer the following question: What are the 
potential consequences of education fund leakages taken by municipal and state public officials for 
Brazilian children studying or residing in the municipalities where leakages occur?  
 
This thesis argues that fund leakages of educational earmarked funds are correlated with 
negative effects for Brazilian children, which have the most negative effects for racially marginalized 
children in public schools. I demonstrate this point by asserting three main arguments. The first is that 
historical education reform has created a structure that enables or facilitates fund leakages with 
education funds. The second is that fund leakages are highly associated with lower educational 
attainment, and third that this association is likely to affect marginalized public school students by 
raising racial inequality, decreasing ability to enter college, and decreasing employment opportunities. 
My findings most closely resemble those of Ferraz, Finan, and Moreira (2012) in “Corrupting 
Learning: Evidence from Missing Education Funds in Brazil,” who argue that in the presence of 
corruption in schools, it is the students that suffer. Taken together, the three consequences impede 
children from securing their right to education and lead to detrimental consequences for Brazil as the 
nation continues to develop internationally.  
 
The argument that fund leakages lead to negative effects for Brazilian children will take place 
over 8 parts. The second part will motivate why the study of corruption in education is of principle 
importance. Third, this thesis will provide background on existing literature to frame discussion on 
corruption and education from a human rights perspective. Fourth, I will provide overview of 
education in Brazil, arguing that the government regime change has set a foundation for large-
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corruption to occur within education. Fifth, I will present corruption scandals of education fund 
leakages in four Brazilian states as investigated by federal police. These scandals will motivate 
analysis in the sixth part, where I argue that corruption is highly correlated with negative effects 
impeding Brazilian children from realizing their right to education. In this section, I argue that fund 
leakages are highly associated with decreased educational attainment, which is likely to lead to three 
negative effects that inhibit children from the realization of their human potential. From this, I 
demonstrate that leakages in education will likely result in increased racial inequality, and decreased 
university enrollment and employment prospects for students studying in environments where 
corruption is present. Seventh, I will build on this analysis and present education policy 
recommendations to prevent future fund leakages. Eighth, I will conclude.  
 
PART II) MOTIVATION 
 
Despite growing evidence of corrupt practices and embezzlement within education, there has 
been little academic attention on the direct effects of corruption on the fulfillment of the right to 
education (Hallak and Poisson, 2002). The expansiveness of corruption in education alone makes the 
topic area worth investigating to better understand how students and children could potentially be at 
risk. For example, according to Transparency International (TI) (2013, xviiii-xx), 2 it is estimated that 
21 million USD was embezzled from education funds in Nigeria in just 2 years and twice that over a 
five-year span in Kenya. This can be particularly harmful if funding does not reach younger children. 
Wenglinsky (279) demonstrates that increased funding in American schools resulted in half a grade 
increase for 8th graders in comparison to a full grade for 4th graders; however, corruption is not cited as 
the source for fund differences (Ibid). As such, the cross-section of corruption and education is 
noteworthy precisely due to the potential damning effects it may have on children (Transparency 
International, 2013).  
 
One negative effect of corruption in education is lower school performance. This thesis is 
motivated by Ferraz, Finan, and Moreira (2012) who exploit data on federal auditing in Brazilian 
public schools. They find that primary school students studying in municipalities where corruption is 
present score 0.35 standard deviations lower than students in non-corrupt municipalities (Ibid). The 
                                                
2 Transparency International is an international non-governmental organization that monitors corruption worldwide.  
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study is one of the first directly correlating corruption and school quality (Bruns et al, 2012, 51-54). 
Another effect is potentially passing on corrupt behavior and attitudes to students. Evidence from Mali 
and Somalia suggests that a greater frequency of teachers neglecting their instruction obligations led to 
students mimicking teacher behavior (Mennerick, 1993).3 When teachers avoided their responsibilities, 
students responded similarly, resulting in lower student discipline and adherence to educational rules 
(Ibid, 419). The negative effects corruption has on education is further explored in Part III, § 4 of this 
thesis; however, the two effects taken together show introductory promise that a greater understanding 
of corruption in education can help motivate policy to increase school performance and promote 
honest, ethical behavior in children.  
 
Research of corruption in education not only holds potential positive benefits for children, but 
for countries, too. Uslaner and Rothstein (2012) demonstrate that across 50 countries, those with the 
most developed education systems in the late 1800’s had the lowest levels of corruption present-day. 
Testing for alternative explanations such as religion, the authors find that increased education is the 
strongest indicator for reducing corruption (5-6). Kenya, Angola, Russia, and Bulgaria are some 
countries with undeveloped education systems in the 1870’s. Tellingly, the aforementioned countries 
ranked as some of the most corrupt according to the 2014 TI Corruption Perception Index.4 This 
historical analysis lends itself to the understanding that quality education is one of the most effective 
means to sustainably combat corruption. Therefore, investing in stronger educational institutions today 
may help a nation reduce corruption. The information and analysis provided in my thesis is done with 
the aim of contributing to a future where governments provide quality education for children. In the 
next Part, I define and survey key concepts relating to the right to education, corruption, and how the 






                                                
3 Teacher neglect of school obligations is known as teacher absenteeism. See Part III, § 4 for further definition and 
discussion.  
4 The Corruption Perception Index measures the level of perceived public corruption in a country by assigning a score of 0 
to 100 with 0 as highly corrupt and 100 very clean.  
Kenya (25th); Angola (19th); Russia (27th); Bulgaria (69th) (Transparency International, 2015).  
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PART III) LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Section 1) The Right to Education 
 
The right to education is a human right. The content and aims of what the right to education 
entails is most comprehensively outlined in Article 13 of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and Articles 28 and 29 of the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (CRC). Both documents specify that education should be pursued on the basis of ensuring each 
child has the ability to participate freely in society and fully develop his or her talents and skills 
(Smyth, 2000) To this end, education should be developed in accordance with four normative 
principles and be i) non-discriminatory, ii) accessible and distributable to populations’ needs regardless 
of group membership, iii) universal for primary and secondary education, and iv) promote human 
solidarity, tolerance, and ethical development (Ibid).  
 
Of the outlined objectives and characteristics, the right to education has the unique 
characteristic of being rights-duplicative, meaning that increased educational attainment can lead to the 
procurement of additional human rights (Ibid, 16). This is demonstrated in over 70 countries where 
increased government education had a positive effect on reducing income inequality. Participants 
reported that increased educational attainment and reduction of income inequality better allowed them 
to procure employment and obtain adequate housing and vital resources such as clean water (Gupta, 
1998). The rights-duplicative nature of education will become an important part of my analysis. Later 
in this thesis, I argue that corrupt fund leakages impede educational attainment for children and 
consequently lead to a decreased likelihood for these children to secure stable economic livelihoods 
(Part VI, § 4-5). In this sense, corruption may contribute to a decreased ability for children to realize 
their educational rights, which in turn decreases the likelihood that children may procure other rights. 
Prior to developing this analysis further, the next section seeks to understand what corruption is.  
 
Section 2) Corruption: A General Overview 
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Corruption is commonly defined as the abuse of public office for private gain (Nye, 1967; 
Rose-Ackerman, 1978). In “Defining Corruption,” John A. Gardiner (2002) notes two characteristics 
about the definition: i) emphasis on an individual in his role as public officer; and ii) emphasis on a 
public official deviating from normal behavior (Gardiner, 2002). As such, this discussion will only 
concentrate on how public officials perpetuate corruption in public institutions of education. 
Corruption is often broken down into at least two categories, grand and petty (Transparency 
International, 2015). Grand corruption is the distortion of state policies to benefit leaders at the 
expense of the public. Petty corruption is low to junior-level officials abusing entrusted power, often to 
the detriment of everyday citizens (Ibid).5 In both cases, the public often bears the brunt of corrupt acts. 
The definition captures multiple types of corruption, monetary and not. One of the most common 
forms is bribery, or attempting to persuade public officials to act a certain way by offering money, 
gifts, or other incentives. Other forms are rent seeking, state capture, diversion, misappropriation or 
theft of state funds. Conversely, shirking, patronage and nepotism are some examples of corruption 
that are often non-monetary (Ibid). They usually involve the manipulation of state policies or public 
appointments in favor of personal utility and interest.  
 
  There are a multitude of corrupt practices that could affect education. Embezzlement, 
favoritism, bribes, bypassing of criteria, nepotism, selling of information, and academic fraud are but 
some (Hallak and Poisson, 2002, 20). The International Institute for Education Planning (IIEP) 
enumerates some ways educational sectors may be affected in practice, which include but are not 
limited to: the building of schools, recruitment, promotion and appointment of teachers, conduct of 
teachers, teacher absenteeism, supply and distribution of equipment, food and textbooks, allocation of 
specific allowances, and examinations and/or diplomas (Ibid). This thesis focuses on fund leakages in 
education only. As such, I will concentrate on common corrupt practices associated with fund 
leakages, such as: embezzlement, fraud, local or state capture, clientelism, nepotism, and shirking. 
Although corruption has potential to have sweeping negative effects on education, there have been few 
publications relating corruption directly to education (Eicher, García-Peñalosa, and Ypersele, 2009; 
Hallak and Poisson, 2001). Instead, there is a significant amount of literature on the correlation of 
education to similar social and economic factors, such as strong economic growth often measured in 
                                                
5 Worth noting is that TI breaks corruption up into three categories—grand, petty, and political (Transparency International, 
2013). For this discussion, my central topic will concern corruption at the administrative and sub-national governmental 
level amongst public officials.  
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terms of GDP and decreasing societal inequality (Chong and Gradstein, 2007). Economist R.J Barro 
(2000) finds that high-test scores strongly correlate with real national GDP economic growth, for 
example. Harold Wenglinsky finds a relationship between targeted school reforms decreasing student 
performance inequality gaps between students from low socioeconomic tiers and students from more 
affluent families (Wenglinsky, 1998). The aforementioned studies are two examples that demonstrate 
the complex and multi-faceted relationship that education bears on society. This relationship is further 
complicated by corruption, which is explored next.  
 
Section 3) The Corruption-Education Relationship: An Introductory Characterization 
 
 In “Education, Corruption, and the Distribution of Income,” authors Theo Eicher, Cecilia 
García-Peñalosa and Tanguy van Ypersele (2009) offer two explanations characterizing the 
relationship between education and corruption. Both are consistent with existing literature, yet one 
may offer more explanatory promise. The question starts from debates on double causality seen 
elsewhere in academic discussion.6 The first is that campaigns curtailing corruption could eventually 
lead to educational increases since monies once used for corrupt exchanges within governments are 
freed for human capital investments. The second is that more education increases human capital and 
informed civic participation, allowing citizens to “punish” and detect corrupt officials more efficiently 
(224-225).7 More succinctly, there may be a link between less corruption and more education (first 
option), more education and less corruption (second option), or both. To the first, although complex, it 
cannot be assumed that corruption amelioration in education would be followed by increased funding. 
Schools may not be allocated additional funds or may not have legal access to them. To the second 
option, there is a correlation between higher educational attainment and higher human capital and civic 
participation. Economists Robert Barro and Jong-Wha Lee examine the relationship over a 40-year 
period in 142 economies, consistently concluding that institutions providing higher quality education 
imply “more skilled and productive workers, who in turn increase an economy’s output of goods and 
services” (Barro and Lee 2001, 541). The analysis of Uslaner and Rothstein (2014) strengthens this 
                                                
6 See “Inequality and Institutions” (Chong and Gradstein, 2007). Controlling for education within populations and 
analyzing Gastil, International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), Freedom House, and World Bank indexes, the authors analyze 
the biconditionality of institutions causing inequality or vice versa. Chong and Gradstein find both to be true: poor 
institutions cause higher inequality and societal inequality creates poor inequality.  
7 See Ferraz and Finan, 2008. This concept of making corrupt practices more transparent to the public will be covered later 
in Part VII.  
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finding by demonstrating that the strength of a country’s education system is one of the strongest 
predictors of its corruption level.  In sum, education has multiple positive effects on society, and the 
corruption-education relationship can be preliminarily summarized as follows: education holds an 
inversely associated relationship to corruption. When people are more educated, those societies tend to 
have lower corruption levels and when there are high corruption levels, populations tend to be less 
educated.  
 
Section 4) Effects of Corruption on Education  
 
Prior to discussing how corruption has negative effects in education, a slight deviation is 
necessary. Causes to violations of the right to education are vast and innumerable. Corruption is but 
one. For the purposes of my discussion, I do not purport that corruption is often the main cause in 
violations to educational rights, nor do I claim that such violations are always stemmed from 
corruption. Rather, I acknowledge corruption as an important contributor in a chain of events leading 
to human rights abuses. All human rights may be compromised due to corruption; however, it does not 
follow that all corrupt acts violate human rights. To understand how corruption violates human rights, 
Julio Bacio-Terracino of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) offers 
a three-step framework to establish if corruption causes human rights violations (Bacio-Terracino, 
2008). The first step is to identify state obligations and necessary actions to protect, respect, and fulfill 
the right under question—in this case, education. The second is to analyze the corrupt act under 
question in the scope and context of the human right. Bacio-Terracino makes a firm distinction 
between corrupt acts directly or indirectly causing human rights violations. The act of deliberate intent 
of the committed action is vital to this distinction. A corrupt act directly violates a human right if it was 
deliberately done to create a violation. An underprivileged Ugandan boy having to pay a bribe to get 
his teacher to grade his tests is one example. The teacher intends to alter whether or not his student 
passes despite merit of student performance without additional payment, thus affecting the student’s 
right to accessible and quality education outlined in Article 13 of the ICESCR.  
 
Conversely, a corrupt act indirectly violates a human right if the violation derived from a 
corrupt act, where that act was necessary but not sufficient to bringing forth the violation (Ibid, 4). 
Imagine that the Mozambican federal government allocated $100,000 USD to pay teacher salary 
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backlogs after 4 months of unpaid work. Local education officials instead embezzled the majority of 
funds for personal gain, compelling teachers to quit and search for more sustainable employment. It 
could be that the educational rights of the students were violated due to the municipality not providing 
teachers as necessary educational resources. The resources, though, were not provided in part due to 
the corrupt acts of local officials. Therefore, the act of stealing thousands of dollars was a necessary 
component that led to a human rights violation. In sum, corrupt acts may lead to human rights 
violations directly or indirectly. As I will show next, corruption has various negative consequences on 
ensuring the fulfillment of the right to education.  
 
Education is an attractive and logical target for corrupt officials due to the sheer amount of 
annual investments governments make.8 Corruption in education takes various forms, and evidence 
shows that its effects lead to lower test scores and student performance, lower enrollment levels, and 
increases in socioeconomic inequality. Similar findings in two continents correlate the presence of 
teacher absenteeism with decreased educational performance vis-à-vis test scores. Teacher absenteeism 
is defined as teachers not being present in the classroom, being present yet not providing scheduled 
lessons, or not being available at school when they are expected or scheduled to be (Banerjee and 
Deflo, 2006). Since teachers fail to perform their duties and responsibilities, teacher absenteeism is 
considered a type of shirking, or avoiding one’s obligations. In Zambia, researchers found that a 5% 
decrease of teacher instruction time correlated with decreased student learning by up to 8% per school 
year (Das et al., 2007). Duflo, Hanna, and Ryan (2012) further strengthened the correlation of teacher 
absenteeism with decreased student learning by taking a time stamped picture of Indian teachers and 
linking school performance to wages. They found that supervision increased teacher instruction time 
by 30% and lead to a 0.17 standard deviation increase in higher post-competency test scores (1275-6). 
The effects of corruption are substantial enough to make a quantifiable, consistent negative impact on 
student performance across cultural and geographical boundaries. The same can be extrapolated with 
the presence of corruption increasing socioeconomic inequality.  
 
Of the 173 countries with free education, it is estimated that 135 require some form of bribe 
payment (Transparency International, 54). Over half of all surveyed families in 7 African countries 
reported bribe payment as a requirement for their child to attend school (World Bank, 2010). 
                                                
8 See Part III, § 1 and Footnote 1 for government expenditures on education.  
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Paradoxically, poorer families are disproportionately more likely to pay education bribes despite not 
being able to afford it. One explanation for this is that wealthier families possess more political or 
institutional power, yielding them with a greater ability to influence teachers and school personnel 
(Transparency International, 52-55). This results in students from poorer families being less likely to 
attend school due to difficulties paying a bribe.9 The need to pay bribes in developing countries 
reinforces income inequality gaps, allowing the rich greater access to education while the same cannot 
necessarily be said for the poor.  
 
In addition to lower learning attainment and increased socioeconomic inequalities, corruption 
and specifically embezzled funds lead to decreased school enrollment rates. Reinikka and Svensson 
(2005) famously explored this by analyzing a Ugandan newspaper campaign targeting educational 
grant leakages that expose embezzlement of school funds by administrators. They find that newspaper 
distribution increases school funds by 60% from the mid-1990’s to 2001, which lead to an average 
increase of 20 students per distributed newspaper (Björkman and Svensson, 2010). Taken from 
multiple countries, it is conclusive that corruption in its various forms leads to negative and 
undesirable effects on students. Academic literature has given a foundation for the discussion of the 
realistic effects that fund leakages can have for children’s futures. In the next Part, I will begin my 
focus on Brazil. Historical, social, and cultural factors will demonstrate how a fragmented education 
system and government transitions have permitted corrupt exchanges of public education funds.  
 
PART IV) BRAZIL 
 
Up until this point I have framed corruption from a human rights perspective and provided 
overview of the intersection of corruption and education. Part IV will explore corruption within 
education by analyzing the country of Brazil in detail. A basic overview of the Brazilian education 
system and key historical developments is necessary. This is done with the objective of understanding 
modern day corruption scandals and fund leakages committed by state and municipal public officials.  
As such, Part IV seeks to provide essential country background by answering the following question: 
What are the Brazilian important historical education policy reforms that have led to or helped 
facilitate corrupt practices in education? Answering this question will require critical overview of the 
                                                
9 The conclusion that bribe-paying is higher for poorer individuals is echoed in other academic research, such as police 
enforcement and traffic. See Fried, Brian J., Paul Lagunes, and Atheendar Venkataramani (2010) for more information.  
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political, economic, and social context of Brazil, which is broken up into five sections. The first will 
provide important overview of historical and current education structure and law. The second will 
discuss corrupt financing schemas created by the military dictatorship. The third and fourth will 
discuss shifting democratic education policies with large block grant funding policies. The fifth will 
overview accountability mechanisms of education finance and argue that current day policies facilitate 
corrupt exchanges in education. 
 
Section 1) Law of Directives and Bases (LDB) and Current Education Structure 
 
Education has long proved to be problematic for South America’s largest country. With a 
population of 200 million people divided over twenty-six geographically and socioeconomically 
diverse states and one federal district, coordinating national policies to educate all citizens is a massive 
task (Central Intelligence Agency, 2015).10 Unfortunately, however, Brazil started this task quite late. 
The Brazilian Ministry of Education (Ministerio da Educação, MEC) was only established in 1930 and 
during such time largely served the middle class (Kosack, 235-6).11 This changed in 1961 when the 
João Goulart administration passed the Law of Directives and Bases (Lei de Diretrizes e Bases da 
Educação, LDB), (Ibid, 245-46). The LDB established the below national guidelines, characteristics, 
and requirements:  
 
1) Decentralization of educational responsibility between the federal, state (Article 10), and 
municipal governments (Article 11) (Title IV); 
2) Structure of primary, secondary, tertiary and vocational education (Section I, Chapter II); 
3) Federal, state, and municipal minimum earmarked education funds based off taxes and GDP 
per territory;  
4) Teacher education requirements:  
a. Primary school teachers must have a secondary degree (Article 52) 
b. Secondary school teachers must have higher-education degree (Article 53)  
                                                
10 Brazil has 26 states and 1 federal district, Brasília. Brasília is not considered a state but shares characteristics that states 
have.  
11 Compare this with the United States of America, which established a national education office in 1867. 
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5) 180 day academic year (Article 72), (President of the Republic, 1996)12 
 
Of all the listed characteristics, the government sought to drastically decentralize education fiscal 
responsibility from the federal government onto state and municipal governments (Filho, 1993). Pre-
LDB, the federal government took primary responsibility for financing education. After the LDB, this 
changed (Ibid, 401-2). The LDB is still the leading piece of legislation outlining the Brazilian 
education system today. Decentralization is evident in the current education system, which I discuss 
next.  
The government provides four types of public education: early childhood, elementary, 
secondary, and post-secondary—or tertiary. Early childhood education is not compulsory and 
corresponds to education for children age 5 or less. Primary education (Ensino Fundamental) is 
compulsory from first to ninth grade for children ranging 6-14 years old (Stanek, 2013). Secondary 
education (Ensino Fundamental) is three years—intended for 15-17 year olds—and has two routes: 
academic and vocation or technological. Students wishing to pursue vocational school may have this 
option as opposed to a more traditional academic track (Ibid, 3-4). Higher education refers to 
university or college studies with students pursuing a bachelors, masters, doctorate, or professional 
degree.13 Taken together, early childhood, primary, and secondary education is referred to as basic 
education (educação basica) and university or tertiary education is higher education (educação 
superior), (Ibid).  
The federal and sub-national state and municipal governments are responsible for administering 
all funding for basic and higher education. Basic education is the responsibility of the municipal and 
state governments. Broken down further, municipal governments are responsible for early childhood 
education while primary education is the responsibility of municipal and state governments. In 
contrast, state governments are responsible for administering secondary education, including 
vocational and technological schools (United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural 
Organisation, 2010). Higher education is the prime responsibility of the federal government and is not 
augmented by municipal or state financial support. Conversely, when necessary, the federal 
                                                
12 Full access to the LDB in Portuguese can be found here: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/Leis/L9394.htm. All 
translations of the LDB are the author’s (“LEI Nº 9.394, DE 20 DE DEZEMBRO DE 1996") 
13 This thesis addresses fund leakages at the public primary and secondary levels. As a result, I will not address higher 
education with the exception of analysis in Part V.  
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government intervenes to increase educational funding when state and municipal governments cannot 
meet minimum expenditures (Ibid). The result of decentralization of fiscal responsibilities creates for a 
complex funding schema to ensure all states—poor or not—reach student spending requirements 
(Bruns et al, 2012, 4-5). This will be discussed in detail in Section 4 as such a schema gives way for 
fund leakages to occur. The following Table summarizes the above information of the current 
education structure.  
Table 1: Public Education Structure in Brazil 
 
Source: Ministry of Education, Brasil (2008); UNESCO, 2011 
 
Section 2) The Military Dictatorship and A Corrupt Structure of Education Finance 
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The decentralized education structure outlined in the LDB was largely dismantled in 1964 
under military dictatorship rule.14 A waning economy, high inflation, and threats of socialism provoked 
the military to re-centralize most authority and resources back to the federal government, where regime 
militants held absolute power. Introduction of highly repressive Institutional Acts suspended civil and 
political rights and granted the regime arbitrary power (Kosack, 253-257). Under these Acts, political 
parties were abolished; the regime legally had authority to remove elected officials at will; and state 
laws and citizens’ rights were suspended for 10 years (Guerchon, 1971, 265-269). The human rights 
violations during this time were innumerable. The 2014 Truth Commission estimates that at least 191 
people were murdered and 243 disappeared.15 Many were tortured, including current president 
incumbent Dilma Rousseff herself (Watts, 2014). Ever since, Brazil has struggled to reconcile the 
widespread human rights abuses that occurred during this time (“Brazilian truth commission: Abuse 
‘rife’ under military rule”, 2014).  
 
Pernicious human rights violations stemming from legally binding Institutional Acts resulted in 
waning popularity of the military dictatorship. A weakened economy and dissatisfied civilian base put 
the dictatorship in a vulnerable position. In response to dissatisfaction, the military utilized education 
as a valuable resource in exchange for support to strengthen its strained relationships with the elite, 
working, and poor classes (Kosack, 257-260). The government completed this process by establishing 
strong corrupt relationships with elite business owners to build schools for the purported benefit of the 
poor. This was done in two steps.  First, the military revised LDB requirements and made primary 
enrollment mandatory. This swelled enrollment rates at increases of 15 million additional primary 
school students by 1972, most of whom resided in the undeveloped northeast regions (Ibid, 260). To 
compensate for enrollment, the government strategically awarded construction and production 
contracts to the wealthy elite who benefited tremendously under military rule. In the northeast state of 
Bahia alone, 20,000 schools were built (Ibid). Most, however, were extremely poor quality. The World 
Bank (1979) reported that of newly built schools, 70% housed 8 grades in a one-room building. One 
report offers a common illustration of a school environment in the northeast (31):  
 
                                                
14 The military dictatorship lasted from 1964-1985 (Guerchon, 1971).  
15 The Brazil Truth Commission released a 2,000 page report after a three-year investigation of human rights abuses 
committed during the military dictatorship from 1964-85. Over 1,000 testimonials documented the names of over 400 
people that disappeared, were murdered, or tortured for political reasons (“Brazil Truth Commission: Torture, executions 
amounted to state policy”, 2014) .  
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 The school is a one-room house where groups of students (officially 
in different grades) sit and stare. The instructor is unlikely to 
have advanced beyond basic level education and is paid less than the 
minimum wage. She is supposed to teach the entire program of studies 
in all grades, but her knowledge of the subjects is, at best, a 
product of sheer repetition. The room is overcrowded. There are no 
textbooks: some volumes were produced but have not been distributed; 
they are too expensive. Unquestioning repetition of the teacher's 
words is equated with learning. When this is achieved, the reward is 
moving to the intermediate or back rows in the classroom (a sign of 
grade promotion). The price of failure is to stay in the same row or 
drop out. The magnitude of the problem is large.  
 
By making primary school enrollment a requirement, the military sought to contract with 
construction companies belonging to elite individuals to strategically reinforce military relationships 
with the wealthy. As wealthy individuals benefited, children did not. MEC statistics during military 
rule demonstrate that only half all funds actually reached schools. 40% of these funds were earmarked 
for “discretionary and off-budget projects”, which made corrupt contracts easily distributable with 
little accountability (Plank, 1990). What appeared as a policy to educate children was, in reality, a ploy 
to subsidize the elite and shore up political support (Plank, Sobrinho, and Xavier, 1996). This was done 
not only with elite business owners, but through political teacher appointments to staff new schools. 
During the military regime the economy suffered influxes of debt and inflation, making teaching jobs a 
coveted resource as they offered a stable, albeit low, source of reliable income. Accordingly with the 
influx of school construction, the demand for teachers increased by 256% from 1964-1989 (Kosack, 
256). To staff Brazil’s new schools, the military did away with LDB teacher requirements mandating 
secondary school degrees.16 As a result, teacher appointments were awarded in exchange for political 
support regardless of teachers’ education levels. To this end, the military’s strong clientelistic network 
of business owners and school employees gave way for pervasive corruption to occur within education.  
 
Section 3) A Shift to Democracy and Education Reform  
 
Military reign did not last, though. Democracy soon came with the presidency of Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso in 1995 (Power, 2010, 219-220). During the military dictatorship, government 
services and resources often benefited the wealthy, as is evidenced with government usage of 
educational funds to build clientelistic networks of political support. Cardoso, and subsequently the 
                                                
16 See page 12 #4 with LDB reference to Article 52 and Article 53.  
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Worker’s Party (Partido de Trabalhadores, PT)17, understood this and sought to shift the beneficiaries 
of government reforms and policies from the wealthy to poor and working class individuals (Hawkins, 
2011). After military rule, the Brazilian education system was left in shambles and in dire need of 
reform (Kosack, 274-283). Due to education finance fragmentation outlined in the LDB (see Table 1), 
poor northern states and municipalities were unable to pay for adequate education systems while 
southern states and municipalities fared better when financing their schools. The result was a deeply 
unequal education system where impoverished regions received little funding due in part to the corrupt 
partnerships outlined in Part IV, §2 (Brown, 2002). As a result, increased educational development 
was concentrated in wealthier southern states, further exacerbating educational differences 
nationwide.18 Recognizing educational inequalities, the Cardoso administration sought to introduce a 
new education finance structure that would equalize the experience and quality of education for all 
Brazilians (de Moura Castro, 2000, 295). The remaining Sections of this Part will outline this finance 
structure and its replacement and demonstrate how current Brazilian finance education policy permits, 
if not promotes, corrupt exchanges.  
 
Section 4) Education Policy Reform: FUNDEF and FUNDEB  
 
In 1998 the Fund for Maintenance and Development of Basic Education and the Valorization of 
Educational Professionals (Fundo de Manutenção e Desenvolvimento da Educação Básica e da 
Valorização dos Profissionais da Educação FUNDEF) was established. FUNDEF had two primary 
functions: (i) to equalize educational expenditures across states regardless of wealth; and (ii) establish 
a federal spending minimum per student. These two aims were achieved through the creation of a pool 
of federal funds. The municipal, state, and federal governments put money into one large funding pool 
(Das Chagas Fernandes, 2003, 7-8). States contributed three-fifths of state revenues, equating to 25% 
of total revenues. Funds from all 26 states and federal district were then redistributed back to 
municipalities and states based on the enrollment rates of students in grades 1-8. Where states could 
                                                
17 PT is the largest political party in Brazil. It was founded in 1989 out of union and labor networks, to which previous 
president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (“Lula”) was an important part. PT continues to be the majority party in power in Brazil 
(Hawkins, 2011).  
18 The educational context post-military dictatorship is greatly simplified in this section. Due to constraints I cannot 
elaborate on educational differences in the North and South further; however, the characterization of education as presented 
is sufficient for understanding motivations for the creation of new education finance policy. For more information on North 
South differences, see “Race, Gender and Regional Labor Market Inequalities in Brazil” by Peggy A. Lovell in the Review 
of Social Economy, Vol. 58, No. 3.  
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not meet minimum spending limits, the federal government would use FUNDEF funds to top off state 
and municipal education funds. FUNDEF top offs meant that not all states received the same federal 
expenditures (Pinto, 2002). States that could meet federal spending limits independent of FUNDEF 
funds would not receive additional money. Most states receiving substantial amounts of extra funding 
were in the North (Bruns et al, 2012, 4-6). Of redistributed monies, 60% by law go to teacher salaries. 
The finance equalization scheme led to substantial enrollment increases and has been considered a 
huge success amongst Brazilian policy makers and international education experts alike (Bruns et al, 
2011, 246). Primary school enrollment rates in the vulnerable North and northeast soared from 77% in 
1998 to 94% in 2008 (Ibid, 5). FUNDEF was doubtlessly considered to be an effective policy as 
increased enrollment rates alone demonstrate how the money pool was able to reallocate resources to 
the most disadvantaged areas to increase education enrollment (Gordon and Vegas, 2004, 3-8).  
 
Despite successes, FUNDEF had two downfalls: (i) its mandate only covered funding for 
grades 1-8, leaving out secondary schools; (ii) it had an expiration date in 2006 (Kosack, 282-283). 
Regarding (i), higher primary school graduation rates oversaturated secondary school enrollment rates 
beyond capability. In addition, despite improvements at the primary school level, secondary schools 
were very poor quality. This meant that there was a very high likelihood students would drop out or 
graduate functionally illiterate (Davies, 2006).19 Recognizing both the successes and concerns of 
FUNDEF, it was extended in 2007 with replaced with a similar fund, FUNDEB. The Fund for the 
Maintenance and Development of Basic Education and Valuing of Education Professionals (Fundo de 
Manutenção e Desenvolvimento da Educação Básica e de Valorização dos Profissionais da Educação, 
FUNDEB) was codified into law by Constitutional Amendment No. 53/2006 (Fundo Nacional de 
Desenvolvimento da Educação). FUNDEB keeps the same basic structure of FUNDEF but extends the 
same equalization scheme and funding reallocation by establishing spending minimums per student for 
early childcare (crèches), secondary schools, and some indigenous groups (Ibid). FUNDEB spending 
minimums are summarized in Table 2 and overall nationwide redistributed expenditures in Figure 1. 
As shown in Figure 1, 2013 FUNDEB funds totaled an impressive R117.6 billion, roughly 29 billion 
USD using 2013 exchange rates (Bruns et al, 2012, 6). With such an abundance of money to be 
siphoned off into local economies, the possibilities for embezzlement and misappropriation are 
                                                
19 Part VI of this thesis will review the low quality of secondary schools.  
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seemingly endless.  
 
Table 2: Minimum Federal Spending Levels Per Student in 2010  
 
Source: World Bank, Brazilian Ministry of Education 
Note: In 2010, the Brazilian government exceeded the above minimums and spent roughly $2605 per secondary student. The funding 
pails in comparison to the OECD country average of $9,313/secondary student. Of 65 analyzed countries, Brazil ranks in the bottom 10 
behind only India, Mexico and Columbia (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2014). 
 
Figure 1: Education & FUNDEF/FUNDEB Expenditures from 2003-2013 in Brazilian Currency
 




                                                
20 For more information, visit: http://www.brasildamudanca.com.br/en/educacao/federal-government-transfers-fundeb-
funds 
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Section 5) Accountability Measures  
The federal government foresaw potential opportunities to embezzle FUNDEB funds and 
responded by establishing monitoring groups as outlined in Articles 70, 71, and 74 of the Federative 
Constitution of the Republic of Brazil (Controladoria-Geral da União, 2012). The groups monitor all 
municipalities and the local spending of federally allocated funds, which is done in small councils. 
Each municipality is required to establish an Accompaniment and Social Control Council, or CACS 
(Conselho de Acompanhamento e Controle Social do FUNDEB), which at minimum must contain 9 
members as defined below: 
• 2 local government representatives 
• 1 municipal secretary of education member 
• 1 representative of teachers in basic education  
• 1 representative of a technical and/or administrative public servant of basic primary school 
• 2 parent representatives 
• 2 student representatives  
 
Source: Freire, “The Responsibility of the Group of Accompaniment and Social Control of FUNDEB”, 2014 
 
Noteworthy is the civilian and municipal nature of each CACS group. Four parent and student 
representatives are tasked with monitoring FUNDEB expenditures. The minimum threshold only 
requires that such individuals are representatives of students and parents without further stipulations 
requiring a background in accounting, economics, or auditing (Freire, 2014). This means that 
according to Brazilian law almost half of the minimum group consistituency does not need a finance 
background in so long as they fit the criteria. Also worth noting is a lack of federal or state advisory 
personnel to monitor fund distribution. The Controller General of the Union (Controladoria-Geral da 
União, CGU)—the federal agency tasked with the corruption prevention—offers an explanation for 
why this is.  
 
According to the CGU’s accompanying manual for CACS members, Live Eye (Olho Vivo), the 
citizen at the municipal level plays a vital role in holding local government accountable (Ibid, 20). 
CACS composition consists of citizens and subnational government officials as to not impose federal 
authority on the autonomy of municipal and state governments. As such, CACS relies heavily on a 
strong local citizen base to ensure that federal FUNDEB funds are transparently allocated to schools 
(Pontes, 2015). Unfortunately, however, the groups do not realize the aspirations of the CGU as many 
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are ineffective. They are either captured by mayors or do not meet frequently enough to actually 
monitor usage. CACS members are not financially compensated, leading to one reason why meetings 
are infrequent. Ironically, members in the government charged with embezzlement are likely to be the 
very individuals tasked with monitoring its usage (Ferraz, Finan, and Moreira 2012, 6). This allows 
mayors and public officials to either bypass or use CACS groups as instruments to facilitate corrupt 
exchange. The CACS, therefore, are ineffective at best and a contradiction in terms at worst. As I will 
show in the next section, with a decentralized finance system lacking effective oversight, education is 
highly vulnerable to widespread corruption.  
 
PART V) CORRUPTION SCANDALS  
 
The sociopolitical history detailing educational policy from the start of the MEC in the 1930’s 
onward gives us context to understand corruption within 21st century education. Part V will detail four 
education corruption scandals post-FUNDEF and FUNDEB implementation. From hereon out, usage 
of the term corruption scandal (or scandal) refers to a federal investigation conducted by federal 
police and CGU officials of the misuse of FUNDEB educational funds by public officials. In short, the 
scandals expose fund leakages of FUNDEB money by public officials. The objective of overviewing 
corruption scandals is to better understand the methods utilized to embezzle funds, the magnitude of 
embezzlement and fraud in dollar amount, and most importantly, how such scandals potentially have 
negative effects on students studying where corruption occurs. States for review in the discussion are 
selected according to three criteria. The first is whether the state was federally investigated for 
FUNDEB corruption accusations. The second is level of marginalization in the population. In this 
discussion, marginalization refers to black, brown, or indigenous individuals with non-European ethnic 
origins.21 The third is Human Development Index (HDI).22 The second and third criteria are chosen for 
two reasons. The first is to better understand how racially marginalized children might be affected 
differently by fund leakages than populations of European descent. The second is to assess how 
                                                
21 Issues of race and marginalization are far more complicated than characterized in this thesis. I have no intention of 
minimizing nuances of racial origin or group; however, for the purposes of my discussion, the term marginalization will 
refer to the three aforementioned groups above. Because Brazil is so racially diverse and roughly half of all Brazilians 
consider themselves brown, I will count states with higher black populations as having higher levels of marginalization. See 
the work by Edward Telles of Princeton University for a richer discussion on race dynamics in Brazil.  
22 The Human Development Index is a composite index created by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to 
measure the overall social and economic development of an area by factoring in statistics regarding education, longevity, 
and economic levels. It is a number of 0-1, with 0 being very low and 1 being very high.  
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children residing in states with less social, economic, and educational resources might be affected in 
comparison with wealthier states more likely to provide services for its residents. As such, the HDI of 
the chosen states is an important indicator regarding a state’s ability to potentially provide resources 
and opportunities for children residing in those areas. It should come as no surprise, however, that 
states with higher marginalized populations are usually the ones with lower HDI indexes. Regarding 
the two criteria, the North/South divide is noteworthy. Brazil is often characterized as two parts with 
the North viewed as poor and marginalized and the South viewed as wealthy and European (Telles, 
2004, 29-31). Due to economic promise, most European immigrant populations settled in the South 
after the federal government opened its borders post-slavery (Ibid). The scandals illuminate important 
divisions between the North and South regions; however, due to constraints I will only elaborate on 
such differences when necessary.23 Two states with low HDIs and two with high HDIs are 
represented.24 Regarding marginalization, one high, one low, and two moderate states are selected. 
Moderate means that more than half of the population considers themselves brown yet black 
populations are relatively low, below 10%.25 This yields the following combinations:  
• Low HDI; High Marginalization  
Poor social & economic conditions; majority black/brown population 
 
• Low HDI; Moderate Marginalization  
Poor social & economic conditions; moderate black/brown populations 
 
• High HDI; Low Marginalization 
Good or adequate social & economic conditions; high white majority population 
 
• High HDI; Moderate Marginalization 
Good or adequate social & economic conditions; moderate black/brown populations 
 
Chosen states to be analyzed from highest HDI to lowest are: São Paulo (0.782; 2nd)26; Amapá (0.7; 
12th); Bahia (0.66; 22nd); and Maranhão (0.639; 26) (United Nations Development Programme, 2013).  
Subsequently, the corruption scandals will be presented in this order. For symmetry and comparative 
purposes, ideally a low HDI and low marginalization (poor social & economic conditions; high white 
majority) state would be represented; however, given realities of where corruption scandals occur and 
                                                
23 See Race in Another America: The Significance of Skin Color in Brazil by Edward Telles (Princeton University Press) for 
more information regarding racial inequalities between the North and South.  
24 By “high” and “low”, I mean high and low comparable to other Brazilian states. HDI comparisons are restricted 
exclusively within Brazil unless explicitly stated otherwise.  
25 Part VI, § 2 provides more specific racial classification breakdown.  
26 Format: (HDI; Rank from 1st to 26th of all Brazilian HDI composites)  
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previously stated concerns with the North/South divide, it appears unlikely to encounter such a 
situation. The rest of this Part will outline the corruption scandal for each of the four states and 
provide brief background information. Part VI will utilize information from the scandals and analyze 
how this affects the ability of children to obtain an education and seek returns to their education, 
concluding that corruption has a high likelihood to negatively situate children in their future. Image 1 
geographically shows the states I will analyze.  
 




Section 1) São Paulo: High HDI; Low Marginalization  
 
São Paulo, located in the southwest of Brazil, is the most populous and wealthiest Brazilian 
state. The capital, São Paulo, boasts the largest GDP per city not only in Brazil, but in all of South 
America, too. The state economy consists largely of financial and exchange institutions, including the 
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largest stock exchange in South America (“Brazil’s Closest Match”, 2014). Of the state’s 11.4 million 
inhabitants, 61% consider themselves white and a combined 37% brown or black (Instituto Brasileiro 
de Geografia e Estatistica, 2010).27 In 2015, São Paulo and 3 other Brazilian states were targeted by 
federal investigators in Operation Águia de Haia for suspicion of embezzling educational FUNDEB 
funds (Teixeira and Menezes, 2015). The municipalities of São Paulo, Guaratingvetá, and Cruzeiro 
were investigated for missing fund leakages (“Operação Águia de Haia: prefeitos levavam 10% dos 
contratos de projetos da educação”, 2015). Specifically, public officials were suspected of being 
involved with business owner Kells Belarmino of Ktech Key Technology (Ibid). The company 
provides administrative computer software to teachers, schools, and students. MEC officials paid 
Belarmino for the creation of the Portal of Education, a software for teachers and students.28 Estimated 
market prices for comparable software are $80 USD per month. News sources quoting the federal 
police estimate that public officials paid Ktech Key Technology roughly $32,000 USD per month 
using FUNDEB funds (“Operação Águia de Haia Faz Buscas Em Cruzeiro E Guará Contra Desvios Na 
Educação”, 2015). Belarmino has since been arrested for duplicating fraud schemes in Bahia and 
Minas Gerais; however, to date no public officials in the three aforementioned municipalities in São 
Paulo have been arrested for corruption charges (Aguiar and Pitta, 2015).  
 
Section 2) Amapá: High HDI; Moderate Marginalization  
 
Amapá is a small northern state bordering French Guiana and is the second least populous in 
Brazil. It contains less than 1 million people, 97% of which live in or around the capital port city of 
Macapá, since 90% of the territory is covered in rainforest (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e 
Estatistica, 2014). The majority of residents live in poverty with 36% subsisting on $20 USD per day 
(Villaverde, 2015). Despite poverty levels, Amapá has the 12th highest human development index in 
the country, exceeding indexes of wealthier states such as Bahia and Minas Gerais (United Nations 
Development Programme, 2010). The state economy is comprised of a large service industry and is 
known for exportation of gold, iron, lumber and timber (“Economia do Amapá”). Three-fourths of the 
population consider themselves brown or black, leaving roughly 24% as white (Instituto Brasileiro De 
Geografia E Estatística, 2010). With high poverty levels, Amapá receives large amounts of FUNDEB 
                                                
27 The Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica, IBGE) compiles the 
most detailed statistics on race and ethnic background. In this thesis, I use the 2010 Brazilian Census.   
28 See Appendix 2 for abbreviations.  
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subsidizes. It is estimated, for example, that municipalities received over $260 million USD from 
2007-2010 (Tito, 2010).  
 
In 2010, a team of 600 federal police commenced Operation Clean Hands (Operação Mãos 
Limpas), a state-wide corruption investigation, amounting to 18 temporary prison and 94 search and 
seizure warrants.29 The Operation’s mission was to investigate and detain individuals involved with 
corruption of FUNDEB funds totaling roughly $59 million USD. Those arrested included the 
governor, ex-governor, wife of the ex-governor, and the President of the State Audit Court (Mendes, 
2015). The governor and other involved parties were accused of eliciting false contracts with the intent 
of embezzlement (“PF Cumpre Busca E Apreensão Em órgão Público Do AP – Geral,” 2011). For 
example, the Secretary of Education paid a private security company more than $68,000 USD per 
month for emergency security services of school premises for over three years. Incriminating evidence 
such as public photographs of confiscated cash and goods helped in linking public officials to 
corruption charges of embezzling large cash lump sums (Santiago, 2015). Image 2 shows publicly 
released photographs of goods stolen using FUNDEB funds. To date public officials have not been 
sentenced to prison as initial warrants only permitted temporary arrest. In commemoration of 
Operation Clean Hands, citizens of Amapá annually host large social gatherings and movie screenings 
against the misuse of public funds by corrupt officials. Events to pressure local governments to arrest 












                                                
29 In other words, the officials originally arrested were later released.  
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Image 2: Operation Clean Hands confiscated materials used as evidence of misuse of FUNDEB 
funds 
 
Source: Globo 201430  
 
Section 3) Bahia: Low HDI; High Marginalization  
 
 Bahia is on the West coast of Brazil north of Minas Gerais. It is the wealthiest northern state 
with a non-white majority population and is eighth richest overall. Of its 15.1 million inhabitants, 62% 
self-identify as brown and 16% as black (Instituto Brasileiro De Geografia E Estatística, 2010). The 
state economy and income generation comes from a large supply and production of chemicals, 
minerals, petroleum deposits, cocoa, and soy (Bahia | State, Brazil,” 2014). As of 2015, the federal 
police are currently investigating Bahia as part of Operation Águia de Haia. Of the 30 targeted 
municipalities spanning 3 states in the Operation, roughly 25 are in Bahia. (Teixeira and Menezes, 
2015). The prime target of the statewide investigation focuses on congressional Deputy and pastor 
Carlos Ubaldino. Ubaldino and other public officials are being accused of operating criminal groups to 
embezzle FUNDEB funds by creating fake contracts with businesses to purchase educational goods. 
Contracts overinflate prices and 10% of funds are kicked back to public officials and 3% to 
intermediaries (“Fraude envolvendo prefeituras e Fundeb somaria R$ 57 milhões, diz PF,” 2015). One 
company under investigation is Transport Union Brazil (União Brasil Transporte) (Teixeira and 
Menezes). In 2015, head of Transport Union Brazil, Alberto Youssef, was imprisoned on corruption 
charges in connection with Operation Lava Jato, the national investigation of corruption connected to 
state-owned petroleum company, Petrobras (Segal, 2015). To date Deputy Ubaldino, other legislative 
                                                
30 “Globo” is one of the leading national newspapers in Brazil.  
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members, and mayors have not been arrested (“PF desarticula grupo que desviou R $57 milhões do 
Fundeb,” 2015).  
 
Section 4) Maranhão: Low HDI; Moderate Marginalization 
 
Maranhão is situated in northeast Brazil and has a population of 6.8 million. It is one of the 
poorer states in Brazil, falling in at 16 out of 26 (Instituto Brasileiro De Geografia E Estatística, 2010).  
The service and industrial sector comprise the largest portion of its GDP with palm trees and timber 
production as primary sources of income. In all, the economic contribution of Maranhão to the total 
GDP of Brazil is less than 1% (“Indústria responde por 15,6% da economia do Maranhão, diz CNI”, 
2014). In 2008, the federal police and CGU investigated public officials for the misuse of FUNDEB 
funds in Operation Bird of Prey III (Operação Ave de Rapina III). There have been 4 Bird of Prey 
operations, each targeting different public bodies in different states. 200 federal police and 30 CGU 
analysts investigated individuals in the municipality of Ribamar Fiquene and city of Imperatriz on 
public fund diversion schemes for the duration of a year and a half (“Operação Da PF Prende 
Quadrilha Que Desviava Verbas Do MA – Política,” 2009). Police posed undercover as officials from 
the MEC and the Ministry of Health and discovered that over 15 million reais, 4.05 million USD, was 
lost due to fraud. Falsification of documents, setting up and contracting fake businesses, approval of 
false bills, setting up false bank accounts, and falsification of signatures were common means of fraud. 
The hastiness of municipalities to sign, approve, and deposit funds with undercover CGU and police 
personnel substantiated evidence and ended in the detainment of 24 public officials in April 2009 
(Ibid).  
 
Four years after Operation Bird of Prey III, Lidiane Leite da Silva took office as mayor of Bom 
Jardim, a small municipality of 41 thousand people 170 miles from the state capital, São Luis.31 Mayor 
Leite fled Bom Jardim in late August 2015 on allegations of embezzling 4 million USD in educational 
funds (“Ex-prefeita de Bom Jardim (MA) Lidiane Leite da Silva foi solta após 11 dias presa por 
suspeita de desvio na verba destinada á educação,” 2015). Investigations were prompted after parents 
persistently complained that their children were not receiving school meals, which many poor families 
                                                
31 Leite de Silva is notoriously known as the “Whatsapp mayor” since she delegated orders to her mayoral cabinet by using 
Whatsapp while living in the capital, São Luis (Alexander, 2015).  
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rely on. In the village of Turi do Augusto, teachers in a school of 50 said their students never received 
a school meal when Leite was mayor (Pressly, 2016). Leite later turned herself into the Federal Public 
Ministry of Maranhão in mid-October 2015 on the condition that she not serve a state prison sentence. 
Instead, Leite negotiated to be under 24-hour supervision by municipal firefighters. As I write this 
thesis, Leite is on probation (“Fugitive Brazil Mayor Lidiana Leite Hands Herself in,” 2015). It is not 
clear whether she will be mandated to reimburse officials for embezzled funds or serve official jail 
time (Araya, 2015).  
 
 
Image 3: The School in Turi do Augusto that did not receive school meals under ex-mayor Leite 
 
 
Source: Pressly, Linda. British Broadcasting Corporation.  
 
The following table presents the information of all four corruption scandals. The information is 
consolidated to facilitate comparisons when analyzing how these four scandals might have adverse 












Table 3: Overview of Federal Investigations of Misuse of FUNDEF/FUNDEB Funds 
 
 




All four of the corruption scandals illuminate the types of practices public officials participate 
in to embezzle funds. Common to all is that public officials divert education funds for personal gain by 
committing some version of fraud. Falsifying documents and contracts or entering into partnership 
with both false and genuine companies is common. This is the case with Kay KTech Technology in 
São Paulo and Transport Union Brazil in Bahia, which illustrate the willingness of public officials to 
enter into corrupt arrangements with private parties. Adding an additional party could potentially 
complicate matters as tracking such companies and their documentation may be harder to do. Another 
common feature of the scandals is when they happened. Table 3 illustrates that of the four states under 
consideration, three experienced corruption scandals of a considerable dollar amount in 2015 alone, 2 
of which continue to receive media attention into 2016.32 The only exception is the case of ex-mayor 
Leite in Bom Jardim, Maranhão. Although Bom Jardim was not federally investigated in connection to 
a larger operation, the embezzled 4 million USD was scandalous enough to make international 
                                                
32 Scandals in Bahia and Maranhão are still being investigated.  
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headlines.33 The two common features of fraud and the fact that scandals are committed current day 
demonstrate that embezzling education funds is a viable and realistic possibility, if not an easy one. 
Not only that, but as shown in Table 3, arrests are infrequent, potentially increasing the appeal to 
embezzle funds and commit fraud. In total, the amount of documented missing funds in all 
investigations equates to 83 million USD. This dollar amount only reflects numbers released by the 
federal police to the local media. It seems likely, therefore, that dollar amounts are higher given the 
legal nature of first needing to secure search and seizure warrants to investigate embezzlement. The 
magnitude of such mismanagement is seen when calculated in terms of student enrollment. With this 
money, 103,750 additional primary school students could have enrolled in school.34 This equates to 
closing 133 medium size urban primary schools for one year due to these four fund leakages alone 
(“Portal do FNDE—Projeto Espaço Educativo Urbano-12 Salas,” 2015).35 Harkening back to The 
Right to Education, (Part III, § 1), denying children the opportunity of schooling violates the 
principles that education should be accessible and universal in scope. As such, impeding children from 
accessing these resources to secure their educational rights constitutes a human rights abuse. If such 
levels of corruption have considerable damage for over one hundred thousand students in hypothetical 
terms, how do these fund leakages affect enrolled students? More specifically, what are the effects of 
the presence of corruption and fund leakages on students and their ability to utilize education to 
increase employment and economic opportunity?  
 
I will answer this question in two steps. The first step is to analyze the educational attainment 
in areas where the corruption scandals occur (or occurred) to see if there is a correlation between 
educational attainment and the presence of corruption. The second step will continue with conclusions 
from the first and analyze how this might impede children from realizing their full human potential, or 
skills and talents. For the first step, I utilize data from the Index of Basic Education and Development 
(Índice de Desenvolvimento da Educação Básica, IDEB). IBED is the principal national indicator of 
                                                
33 See “Fugitive mayor Lidiane Leite turns herself in”, 30 September, 2015, BBC, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-
america-34400836 
34 Calculated with FUNDEB-mandated 2010 spending levels; see Table 2 for reference.  
35 This calculation is based off of a 2015 urban school project construction manual. Specifications are for a 12 classroom 
urban school fitting 780 students in total. Based on this estimate, the number of rural schools that would equate to would be 
substantially higher as rural schools tend to be smaller in size. See http://www.fnde.gov.br/programas/par/par-projetos-
arquitetonicos-para-construcao/projeto-12-salas for more information.  
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educational quality and quantifies student learning with national test scores and passing rates.36 Scores 
are offered at the national, state, municipal, and individual school level.37 For each score, the MEC 
provides realistic score goals that schools should be able to meet, if not surpass. This results in scores 
of two kinds: (i) the actual IBED score received; (ii) the IBED goal set by the MEC. The index is a 
score of 0-10, with 10 signifying the highest level of comprehension and passing rate and 0 the worst. 
As a representation, the scores take the following form: Actual Score/Goal Score. 3.8/4.4 is an 
example, meaning that the municipality actually scored a 3.8 and did not meet its MEC goal of 4.4. 
Scores reflect the aggregate educational performance of two tested groups—late primary and lower 
secondary school students. This corresponds to first-fifth and fifth-eighth grades, respectively.38 To 
analyze fund leakage and educational attainment, I examine the aggregate IBED scores and MEC goals 
of all the municipalities where corruption scandals occurred in Part V. If the presence of corruption is 
correlated with lower educational attainment for students residing in areas affected by fund leakages, I 
expect to see that municipalities would not be meeting their MEC IBED score goals.  
 
This is the finding exactly. Of the analyzed 31 municipalities that were investigated for fund 
leakages in the four states, I found that there is a 68% likelihood that primary and secondary schools 
did not meet their educational IBED goals but rather decreased in educational performance. As IBED 
tests primarily mathematics and Portuguese language arts, such findings illustrate that where fund 
leakages are occur, students frequently have a lower probability of meeting their educational goals. On 
average, municipalities did not meet their goals by 0.4 points. This equates to a drop of comprehension 
in material by the equivalent of one letter grade in the United States (Ibid). The majority of the time, 
therefore, where there are fund leakages, there is also a decreased ability to comprehend school 
material and this is negatively affected in school grades. Such a correlation provides compelling 
evidence that the presence of corruption and fund leakages is strongly associated with decreased 
educational attainment in at least two vital areas, mathematics and language comprehension. Table 4 
represents this information in full. The only exception is the state of Amapá. Data of municipalities in 
Amapá were not included as Operation Clean Hands as the investigation primarily targeted key 
                                                
36 IBED uses Brazil Test “Prova Brazil” and the System of Evaluation of Basic Education (Sistema de Avaliação da 
Educação Básica SAEB) to composite national education scores. 
37 All the data used in the Analysis is public and taken from the IBED database, found here: http://ideb.inep.gov.br/. All 
cited IBED scores in this thesis come directly from this website with primary concentration on the municipal level. Data 
manipulation and calculation is done exclusively by the author.  
38 See Table 1 of this thesis for grade and school level breakdown.  
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individuals—not municipalities. As such, this data is not included; however, it is worth nothing that 
Amapá did not reach its MEC statewide defined IBED score goals for both first-fifth and fifth-eighth 




Table 4: Education Attainment in Municipalities where Corruption Scandals and FUNDEB Fund 
Leakages Occur  
 
 
Source: IBED  
                                                
39 Had Operation Clean Hands in Amapá targeted municipalities as opposed to specific individuals, it is likely that the 
probability of lowered educational performance in the presence of corruption would have been higher given the statewide 
scores did not reach their MEC IBED goals. 
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 Such findings of decreased educational attainment in the presence of fund leakages beg the 
following question: What are the consequences of these leakages on educational attainment in realistic 
terms? Put another way, how does the strong association between leakages and decreased educational 
performance affect children in municipalities where corruption occurs? Unfortunately, these questions 
as posed make children the victims of abuse by the governments and officials employed to serve them. 
The two questions together will be analyzed by utilizing national background of current day Brazilian 
political and social context. As such, I will argue that fund leakages in education are likely to result in 
three negative, sequential consequences for children. The first is that increases in racial inequality are 
likely. The second is that marginalized students will be less likely to enter university on merit. The 
third will build on the second, arguing that there will be less likelihood for marginalized children to 
overcome poverty to procure returns on education vis-à-vis employment opportunities. Combined, 
when the three consequences hold, they will likely lead to a negative aggregate outcome for the future 
of Brazil, motivating the need for current day educational finance policy reform.  
 
Section 2) Racial Inequality Increase 
 
Of the four states analyzed, racial demographics are broken down as follows:  
• Maranhão: Brown 66.7%; Black 6.4%; White 26% 
• Bahia: Brown 62%; Black 16%; White 21%  
• São Paulo: Brown 30.5%; Black 6.5%; White 61% 
• Amapá: Brown 69%; Black 6.5%; White 24% 
 
Source: Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics, “Censos Demográficos: Indicadores Sociais Municipais: 
uma análise dos resultados do universe do Censo Demográfico Tabelas de Resultados”, 2010.40  
 
The statistics show that three analyzed states have a majority of brown or black residents. 
Maranhão, Bahia, and Amapá all have majority populations with brown or black residents totaling over 
70% (Instituto Brasileiro De Geografia E Estatística, 2010). Such information implies that children 
under consideration belong to marginalized groups. As such, findings from the municipal performance 
of schools affected by fund leakages show that educational attainment generally is lower in states with 
marginalized students. Table 4 demonstrates this fact. Of supplied data, only two states, Bahia and São 
                                                





Paulo, received IBED scores of 5 or above. Between the both, São Paulo more consistently received 
5’s while Bahia only received one in all the examined municipalities. The aggregate IBED scores of 
the four states show São Paulo’s dominance in high educational performance. Statewide in 2013, 
Manahão averaged 3.85; São Paulo 5.4; Bahia 3.85 and Amapá 3.6. On average, then, students from 
São Paulo are performing over 1 letter grade higher than their peers in northern states. These scores 
contribute to the conclusion that educational attainment is worse in states with high densities of 
marginalized populations. This conclusion is supported generally when contrasted with other states 
whose majority demographic is white or of European descent. Rio de Janeiro and Minas Gerais both 
have majority white populations and enjoy comparatively high statewide IBED test scores of 4.7 and 
6.2, respectively. Taken in context of the nation-wide Brazilian aggregate IBED score of 5.2, states 
with highly marginalized populations did considerably worse. Such differences demonstrate that brown 
and black children are put at higher risk of having lower educational performance and attainment than 
students belonging to states with white majorities. This is important because despite São Paulo not 
reaching its IBED goals in municipalities where fund leakages are present as shown in Table 4, those 
students still did considerably better than black or brown students in states where corruption is present. 
The following suggests that the presence of fund leakages has greater potential to hurt the educational 
development and attainment of brown and black students than it would with white students. This 
means fund leakages are likely to increase racial inequalities in terms of having greater negative 
impact on brown and black students than white students belonging to states with majority white 
populations. Inequalities between races create various negative effects, and the next section will 
examine how decreased educational attainment for marginalized children can negatively affect their 
ability to enter university.   
 
Section 3) Greater Difficulty Entering University 
 
One reason racial differences in educational quality and attainment matter is that education is 
rights-duplicative, or a means to secure opportunities for employment and greater quality of life 
(Shinn, 369).41 Steps to procuring opportunities leading to increased life quality are often predicated on 
a student’s ability to obtain a university degree (Fredriksson, 1997). In this section, I argue that 
decreased educational attainment of marginalized students as associated with the presence of fund 
leakages caused by corruption is likely to decrease the ability of students to enter university on merit. 
                                                
41 See Part III, § 1 
 37 
My argument hinges on two reasons. The first is that public school education is poor quality. The 
second is that poor quality education does not enable students to compete with private school students 
on university entrance exams. To the first, the previous section concluded that fund leakages are likely 
to increase racial inequalities by negatively impacting marginalized students in comparison to white 
ones in the public school system. This conclusion is made worse by the already poor quality of public 
school education in Brazil, as is illustrated by international test scores.  
 
Every three years the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) tests 
public school students in 65 countries on math, science, and reading with the Programme for 
International Student Assessment (PISA) (“Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) 
Overview”). Consistently, despite Brazil’s educational expenditures exceeding nations such as the 
United States, Japan, and South Africa, Brazil’s PISA test scores are abysmal. In 2012, Brazil scored 
58th on math, 59th on science, and 55th on reading. The OECD reports that slightly less than half of 
Brazilian students perform at baseline proficiency levels in reading. This translates to students not 
being able to analyze or comprehend a text beyond identifying the main idea (Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, 2012). Such low student performance has in part led the 
World Bank to refer to Brazilian public schools as “drop out factories” as 30% of all primary school 
students drop out before completing school and 25% of all secondary school students drop out before 
graduation (Bruns et al, 2012, 47). For those that graduate, it takes many primary school students 11 
years on average to complete 8 years of schooling, and for secondary school students, roughly 15% are 
25 years old at graduation (Ibid). Coupled with previous analysis, not only are brown and black 
students affected more in the presence of fund leakages than white students, but the poor quality of 
education at the public level confirms that when corruption happens in public schools, there is a high 
probability that the quality of education that these students receive is actually very low. 
 
A low quality education decreases marginalized students’ abilities to enter university for two 
reasons. First, students able to attend private school are more likely to take competitive spots in 
universities that would greatly benefit marginalized students. Given the statistics presented above, 
parents recognize the poor quality of public education and opt to enroll their children in good quality 
private schools when financially possible (Kosack, 260). With black and brown populations 
representing 73% of those in poverty, the private school student body is overwhelmingly white 
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(“Affirming the Divide”, 2012). These students do considerably better on secondary school exams. 
Test scores of the 2005 Evaluation System of Basic Education (Sistema de Avaliação da Educação 
Básica, SAEB) for math and science substantiate this claim. Overall, on a scale of 0-500 with 500 
being a perfect score, northeast private school students received a 292 in comparison to 226 of 
northeast public students, a 66-point difference. This is consistent in southern Brazil, where public 
school students received a score of 255 and private school students a 307 (Rodrigues De Oliveira, 
Belluzzo and Toldo Pazello, 2009, 5-6). Such differences are important in the context of university 
entrance requirements. As shown in Table 1, the federal government is responsible for financing 
universities, which it does fully. In other words, all 97 federal tertiary institutions are free of charge. 
This makes them fiercely competitive. Not only are such universities advantageous since they come at 
no cost, but they are regarded as Brazil’s most prestigious institutions of higher learning. To apply, 
students are judged primarily on their test scores of the mandated entrance exam, the vestibular 
(Marteleto, 2012). Even though only 13% of secondary students attend private secondary schools, 
these students usually perform much better on the vestibular. This is reflected in federal enrollment 
statistics vis-à-vis racial demographics. For example, in specialized schools such as medical schools, 
roughly 90% came from private schools with 75% that are white (Marcus, 2015). In 2000, roughly 
80% of all university students were white as were 98% at the University of Brasilia in 2012 (Public 
Broadcasting Station, 2007). The federal government responded to university racial inequality by 
passing Law No. 12,7111, a national affirmative action law mandating 50% of all federal university 
entrance be reserved for marginalized and/or public school students by 2016. These students apply to a 
special application pool with less strict standards, meaning such students do not enter university on the 
same merit system as the standard pool (Ibid).  
 
The resulting poor quality public education as well as competition from more educated private 
school students makes it insurmountably more difficult for public school students to enter university on 
their own merits alone without affirmative action. Since fund leakages are more likely to affect the 
educational attainment of marginalized students vs. white students, it is unlikely that such students 
could compete with privately educated individuals to enter university. Instead, affirmative action is a 
more likely avenue given low-test scores of public students in corrupt municipalities. As such, by the 
time these students apply to university, they are disadvantaged at least three key times. The first 
disadvantage is the already low quality of the public school system. The second is that this quality is 
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lowered even further when corruption is present. The third is that this hurts test scores and the ability 
to perform well on exams such as the vestibular in comparison to private school students.42 Such 
consistent lowering of education quality hurts students that are victims of fund leakages when applying 
to university, and the next section will outline what types of consequences this may have on 
employment opportunities.  
 
Section 4) Decreased Employment Opportunity 
 
The last two sections have concluded that fund leakages at the primary and secondary 
education level can lead to an increase of racial inequalities and decrease of educational attainment, 
which has negative potential consequences at the university level. Thus far, the focus of my analysis 
has been marginalized children affected by the presence of corruption in school—both at the primary 
& secondary and federal university levels. In this section, I will continue my emphasis on these 
children but will concentrate on how the last two sections affect quality of life vis-à-vis future 
employment prospects. Given the two negative consequences of increases to racial inequality and 
decreased probability of entering university for marginalized students learning in the presence of 
corruption, I argue that it is unlikely these students43 will have employment opportunities that allow 
them to escape disadvantaged economic situations.  
 
The first reason there is decreased likelihood for marginalized children to escape a 
disadvantaged economic situations is because education and the labor market have long been plagued 
with racism. A strong foundation of racial discrimination dates back to 1888 when Brazil became the 
last country to abolish slavery. During that era, the government was highly influenced by popular 
sentiment of African and black inferiority and subsequently encouraged Europeans to enter Brazil 
while restricting access to Africans (Birdsall and Sabot, 1996). The government promoted campaigns 
of inter-racial breeding to whiten the country’s phenotype, to which the concept of racial democracy 
was vital. Racial democracy is a concept specific to Brazil. Although complex, it is the attitude or idea 
                                                
42 Andrabi Tahir explores challenges the merits of private and public school divides in his working “Are Bad Public 
Schools Public ‘Bads?’ Test Scores and Civic Values in Public and Private Schools.”  
43 For clarity’s sake, when referencing “students” or “children” I mean marginalized children of brown or black race who 
studied/study in schools and municipalities affected by FUNDEB fund leakages caused by corruption. I will explicitly note 
otherwise if the term is used differently.  
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that because Brazil has never had laws or policies against inter-racial mixing—e.g. schooling or 
marriage—but instead promoted racial mixing, the country is not only racially homogenized, but it has 
overcome racism altogether (Hanchard and Winant, 1999).44 Under the guise that Brazil is not a racist 
culture, many racist and discriminatory practices have occurred, and wage discrimination and 
education differences verify this. On average white Brazilians make twice as much as Afro-Brazilians, 
who are twice as likely to be service workers than whites.45 Of whites that are service workers, 
however, they get paid twice as much for the same services. Employment and wage prospects are 
reflective of education completion rates (do Valle Silva and Hasenbalg, 1999; dos Santos, 2006). 
White Brazilians are three times more likely to complete high school and college than blacks (do Valle 
Silva and Reichmann, 1999). These statistics reflect racial divides fueled by historical traditions of 
African inferiority post-slavery, which becomes problematic when looking at employment prospects 
for students studying where corruption is present.  
 
Sociologist and scholar on Brazilian race dynamics Edward Telles explains that as Brazil 
started to more rapidly develop at the turn of the century, returns to education vis-à-vis employment 
opportunities increased sharply at the university level but decreased at the secondary level. This means 
that marginalized students in corrupt school environments are not likely to benefit only from finishing 
secondary school. They must finish university, too (Telles, 126-7). Statistics show that this is not the 
case, however. The National Institute of Educational Studies and Searches (Instituto Nacional de 
Estudos e Pesquisas Educacionais Anísio Texixeira, INEP) annually compiles data on university 
matriculation rates per region.46 Table 5 illustrates university regional matriculation rates. The 
marginalized students under consideration in the corruption scandals discussed in Part V are in the 
North, northeast, and South regions.  
                                                
44 This is contrasted with racism in the United States. Paulo Freyre, a famous Brazilian sociologist and anthropologist, 
visited Waco, Texas and observed American laws favoring school segregation and anti-miscegenation. Upon viewing the 
United States, he concluded that Brazil had overcome racism as the population was able to coexist and mix unlike the U.S.  





Table 5: 2012 Matriculation Rates Per Region  
 
 
Comparatively, Table 5 illustrates that students from São Paulo are at least twice as likely to 
matriculate in universities than students from Bahia, Maranhão, and Amapá. When combined with 
analysis by Edward Telles, this means that half of all students in the South are able to seek 
employment opportunities that are likely to increase economic prosperity. The same cannot be said for 
students in Amapá. Roughly 10% of all residents are unemployed as jobs growth slows. For example, 
in February 2015 alone, 27,500 construction and agriculture job opportunities closed, making it harder 
for the 10% of northeast students with university degrees to procure adequate employment 
opportunities (Martello, 2015). As northern states such as Amapá face harsher economic realities than 
richer states such as São Paulo, it is more difficult for northern marginalized students to escape poverty 
given the low educational attainment correlated with corruption and a poor local economy. Therefore, 
it appears unlikely that marginalized students will be able to obtain educational returns vis-à-vis 
employment opportunities.  
 
Section 5) Education Quality and the Future of Brazil 
 
Until this point, analysis has demonstrated how a strong correlation between fund leakages and 
decreased educational attainment can have realistic negative effects for children studying in corrupt 
environments. I have argued that decreased educational attainment associated with corruption is likely 
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to result in an increase of racial inequalities, decreased ability of such students to enter university, and 
less likelihood for said students to overcome poverty vis-à-vis employment opportunities. As such, 
negative consequences impeding children from obtaining an education is likely to make pursuing other 
rights or opportunities more difficult, demonstrating the rights-duplicative nature of education (Part III, 
§ 1). Given these three negative consequences, a natural question emerges. What does this mean for the 
future of Brazil as a country? I explore this question in this section, arguing that should Brazil continue 
on the path examined in Part VI (§ 1-4) of this thesis, it is improbable that Brazil will be able to 
sustain itself as it fails to develop its own citizen base to meet domestic needs.  
 
Examination of the supply and demand in the Brazilian economy demonstrates that 
complications in the Brazilian education system fail to meet the demand of employers seeking capable, 
talented individuals. This is evident in the shift of the Brazilian labor force in the past decade. Studies 
by the World Bank demonstrate that there has been a 10% decline in blue-collar jobs and a steady 
increase of white-collar jobs. An increase of non-manual, blue-collar jobs reflects economic shifts 
towards a need for managerial, professional skills—what researchers call “new economy skills” (Bruns 
et al, 25). New economy skills require non-repetitive, higher cognitive functioning abilities to solve 
non-linear problems and work in group settings to solve more complex issues. Not surprisingly, 
Brazilians possessing these skills are often college educated and are among the wealthiest. With 
shrinking demand for blue-collar jobs often requiring repetitive or manual tasks, there is a need for 
education that reflects the labor market demands and the new economic shift (Ibid, 28-31). This 
reinforces not only the need for increased access to college education for all Brazilians, but an 
education system that fosters a strong foundation to develop high-level cognitive skills. By analyzing 
fund leakages alone and the effects this potentially has on children in a poor quality education system, 
my hope is that it is clear that Brazil is far from meeting its own labor demands.  
 
To this, economists agree that the Brazilian population is not sufficiently educated enough to 
sustain its own market needs. Overall, analyzing education levels and skills, it is estimated that 
approximately 22% of the Brazilian population is not ready to enter the labor market (Manrique, 
2010). Observation from employers substantiates the estimates of economists. In a study that 
interviewed over 40,000 employers in 39 countries, roughly 60% of Brazilian employers stated that 
they were unable to find qualified work candidates. Professions lacking qualified individuals include 
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those requiring developed skills in mathematics, science, management, finance, and law (Anderson, 
Baldwin, Lovallo, and Pumariega, “Will a Shortage of Qualified Labor Derail the Brazilian 
Economy?”, 2012). An inadequate education system that insufficiently prepares Brazilians for the 
work force has forced employers to take matters in to their own hands. Engineering, chemical, 
healthcare, and agribusiness companies are but some examines of the kinds of companies that have 
created their own educational programs to train professionals in advanced studies.47 The government 
has augmented a lack of trained Brazilians by actively recruiting foreigners. In 2014, 94.6% of work 
visas went to skilled foreigners, totaling more than 230,000 individuals (Rinaldi, 2014). Ricardo Paes 
de Barros, Undersecretary for the Secretariat of Strategic Affairs of the Presidency of the Republic of 
Brazil estimates that Brazil needs 10 times the current amount of skilled foreigners to sustain market 
needs (Paes de Barros, 2015). Fittingly, Paes de Barros holds postgraduate degrees from two American 
universities, the University of Chicago and Yale University (“Richardo Paes de Barros”). As the 
Brazilian economy shifts and its public education system consistently demonstrates failure to prepare 
its citizens to fill needed vacancies in the labor market, the country is in need to rectify complications 
in its education system.  
 
The above analysis provides strong evidence to suggest that the growth and evolution of the 
Brazilian economy has outpaced the nation’s ability to educate its citizens to enter the work force as 
skilled individuals (Badkar, 2014). Not only has the economy outpaced the education system, but it has 
done so at a substantial rate. The Boston Consulting Group estimates that in less than 5 years, Brazil 
will have a shortage of 8.5 million skilled workers (Boston Consulting Group, “Global Workforce 
Crisis Puts $10 Trillion at Risk in World Economy, Study Shows”, 2014). This is the equivalent of not 
adequately educating or preparing the entire population of Switzerland, Bulgaria, or Benin (World 
Bank, 2014). By running the risk of not providing services to its own citizens vital for sustainable 
economic growth, the Brazilian federal government will likely be forced to rely on outside skilled 
foreigners to take its highest paying employment vacancies. (Rinaldi, 2014). To avoid shortage of 
skilled labor complications in a changing economy, it will be necessary to introduce substantive 
education reform. One such necessary reform will need to address complications arising from 
corruption. In this thesis, I have demonstrated how the presence of corruption and documented fund 
leakages is highly associated with decreased educational attainment by analyzing MEC data from 
                                                
47 Orteng, Odebrecht, and Novartis Biociencias S.A. are examples of companies with their own education programs.  
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corrupt municipalities in São Paulo, Amapá, Maranhão, and Bahia. The importance of this association 
is contextualized in what this realistically means for children and their futures. I have demonstrated 
that increases to racial inequality, decreased ability to attend university, and decreased employment 
prospect are likely to occur. As children are the future population of any country, any negative effects 
associated with corruption and fund leakages in education are doubtless to affect the future of their 
country, too. Given the amount of available funds not reaching schools, this is unacceptable and 
warrants change. To this end, I will propose policy recommendations to mitigate the aforementioned 
complications spelled out in the Analysis part of this thesis. Recommendations are not meant to 
comprehensively resolve Brazil of education concerns. Rather, they are a first, necessary step in the 
right direction to ensure that all school funds reach students to aid their life development and not the 
selfish desire of corrupt public officials.  
 
PART VII) POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Section 1) The Problem and Target for Reform  
 
If fund leakages are associated with lower learning attainment, recommendations seek to 
guarantee that all intended education funds go to schools and the students they serve. Prior to 
proceeding with recommendations, identifying where the problem lies is key. Part V of this thesis 
outlining the 4 corruption scandals of FUNDEB funds shows that millions, 83 to be exact, are lost to 
fraud. Common methods to commit fraud involve over-invoicing, as is the case in Bahia with 
Transport Brazil Union (Part V, § 3); fake contracts such as KTech Key Technology in São Paulo (Part 
V, § 1); or mayoral and state capture of councils monitoring FUNDEB as is evident in Amapá where 
the governor, ex-governor, and the State Audit Court conspired to steal funds (Part V, § 2). The 
problem, then, is not that municipalities and states are not receiving funds from the federal 
government. They are.48 Rather, the problem lies in local and state officials failing to transfer these 
funds to schools. Therefore, reform should concentrate here. To mitigate fraud, public officials must be 
held accountable in a transparent manner for their usage of FUNDEB funds. This is the prime 
responsibility of municipal monitoring councils, CACS.49 As structured; however, they are 
                                                
48 See Figure 4 to review total allotted federal funding to states and municipalities.  
49 See Appendix 2 for abbreviations.  
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ineffective.50 Accordingly, Brazil should aim to ensure transparency and accountability of school 
spending by public official at the state and municipal level.  
 
Three specific cultural considerations must be factored in given Brazil’s unique historical and 
cultural context. The first is recognition that mayoral or higher-ranking political capture of CACS 
groups is common and poses a large threat to the integrity of the CACS councils. This is present in 
three of the four corruption scandals—Amapá, Maranhão, and Bahia. For example, Malrinete Grahada, 
ex-vice mayor under Lidiana Leite of Maranhão, explains that Leite prohibited her from attending 
education finance meetings (Pressly, 2016). The second element that must be factored into 
recommendations is a general respect for separation between the federal and local governments. Recall 
that the CGU CACS publication Olho Vivo claims that the reason CACS members are comprised 
exclusively of local members is out of respect for the autonomy of local and state governments.51 Later 
in my recommendations I argue against this consideration in favor of auditing and financial 
competence to adequately ensure accountability; however, at minimum some respect for lower 
government autonomy ought to be maintained. The third consideration is the role of private citizens. 
The Brazilian Constitution clearly upholds the value of public participation, stating that, “all power 
emanates from the people” (Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil). This is true in CACS, 
where the federal government places high expectations on citizen involvement as a method to monitor 
funds. Any reform consideration, therefore, must engage the public in a substantive manner. In total, 
recommendations must address FUNDEB spending transfers by public officials to schools at the local 
level to ensure CACS groups can effectively monitor with consideration of: i) local capture of CACS 
groups; ii) government autonomy; and iii) public involvement. To this end, the following policy 
recommendations are outlined per each involved group.  
 
Section 2) Policy Recommendations 
 
a) CACS Structural Reforms 
 
i. Mandate financial or economic background and expertise of all CACS members 
ii. Make financial remunerations for CACS members to incentivize meetings 
                                                
50 See Part IV, §5 of this paper and pages 6-7 of “Corrupting Learning: Evidence of Missing Education Funds in Brazil” by 
Ferraz, Finan and Moreira for more information on ineffectiveness of CACS groups.  
51 See p. 19-20 of this thesis.  
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iii. Require meeting participation and attendance 
b) Federal Government Reforms 
 
i. Contract one CGU auditor or representative into each CACS group to hold local groups 
accountable to the federal government  
ii. Make the CGU manager of the group  
iii. Carry out punishment charges of corrupt public officials to set example of clear 
consequences for criminal activity 
c) Public Official Reforms 
 
i. Mandate the submission of all receipt copies to CACS groups per month  
ii. For charges more than a defined amount of money, require public officials to quote 
multiple companies offering similar services before purchase52 
d) CACS Monitoring Reforms 
 
i. Generate monthly expense reports and disseminate on public websites to promote 
transparency  
ii. Submit “report cards,” or evaluations of how public officials spend money and where, 
at least twice a year detailing public spending by officials; have the report cards rate 
municipalities on transparency; distribute to schools, public officials, the CGU and 
federal government, and public government websites for public view 
 
e) School Reforms 
 
i. Create advisory committee or designate at least one individual to work in conjunction 
with CACS  
ii. Have the committee or individual be the liaison between the school and CACS; have 
said individual(s) be the point of contact to receive municipal report cards or expense 
reports outlined in d (ii) 
iii. Have the committee or individual relay suspicion of corrupt acts to the CACS  
f) Public Engagement  
 
                                                
52 Each municipality should dictate the appropriate amount of money.  
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i. Have the CACS parent and student representatives work with the CGU manager to 
generate an annual letter or short report to the public to be distributed to parents in the 
municipality concerning spending 
 
Section 3) Discussion  
 
All policy reforms are an introductory attempt to incorporate successful worldwide anti-
corruption measures tailored to a Brazilian context. The reforms aim to deter public officials from 
abusing FUNDEB funds by strengthening CACS groups and their improved cooperation with schools 
and the public through the emphasis of three intervention approaches.53 The first is information 
gathering. In order to diagnose the problem or see how public officials are deviating from responsible 
use of FUNDEB funds, it is necessary to first gather information. Policy reforms c (i)-(ii) and d (i)-(ii) 
requiring receipts, expense reports, and public reports, or “report cards,” build a foundation for CACS 
groups, schools, and the public to understand where money is going in a more transparent manner. 
With this information, CACS groups can begin to monitor spending patterns. Public officials easily 
bypassing CACS groups to commit fraud motivates a need for a strong anti-corruption group that 
officials will see as a direct threat. As sits, CACS groups are weak; however, lessons from other 
international anti-corruption agencies or monitoring campaigns may prove useful.54 The Brazilian 
CGU shows introductory promise of being taken seriously as a national anti-corruption agency. In all 
four of the analyzed scandals, the CGU publicly is helping or helped investigate fraud alongside the 
police.55 Investigations by the CGU have had considerable positive effects on the public in helping 
deter corruption vis-à-vis municipal elections. Ferraz and Finan (2008) demonstrate that corrupt public 
officials were almost 20% less likely to be reelected after the CGU publicly released the corrupt 
practices of said officials. This study—among others (Di Tella and Schargrodsky, 2003)—illustrates 
that anti-corruption groups or campaigns can potentially be a real threat to public officials. 
Unfortunately, however, CGU investigations only take place after the corrupt acts occur. To target 
corruption in education, it may prove useful to introduce at least one CGU member into CACS as a 
                                                
53 Bruns et al (2011) survey accountability education measures in their book “Making Schools Work” and conclude that a 
multi-faceted approach to utilizing various accountability measures works best to optimize school success (239).  
54 Hong Kong’s anti-corruption agency, the Independent Commission Against Corruption, is one example. It has been 
credited for transforming Hong Kong into one of the cleanest cities in the world for its anti-corruption measures involving 
law enforcement, prevention, and community education (Skidmore, 122-127) 
55 See Part V.  
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preventative measure to deter officials from stealing FUNDEB funds as noted in b) Federal 
Government Reforms. 22 studies in 11 countries examining how the public engages in corruption in 
the education sector found that the public helps give a “voice” or “client power,” which can be 
leveraged against public officials and in turn increase the success of education accountability measures 
(Bruns et al, 212). This was the case in Uganda (Reinikka and Svensson, 2005) and the Philippines 
with publicly sharing textbook purchases led to increased school resources (Khattri, Ling, and Jha, 
2010). Both studies demonstrate that the public can help make officials more accountable to schools. 
Alongside Brazil’s commitment to public engagement, the public has been included in the reforms 
twice. The first is to share CACS finding with the public as shown in d (ii); the second, f) Public 
Engagement, aims to compel community members to take part in making public officials responsible 
with a report specifically targeting the public. Taken together, it is my hope that the reforms have 
potential to guarantee that children receive the educational resources intended for them.  
 
PART VIII) CONCLUSION  
 
In this thesis, I demonstrate that fund leakages of Brazilian education funds committed by public 
officials have negative effects for children. Analysis of current day corruption scandals in four states 
amounting to over 83 million USD illustrate that corruption in education is a pervasive phenomenon 
affecting Brazilian societies. By examining MEC data, I found that 68% of all municipalities where 
fund leakages took place (or are currently taking place) suffer from decreased educational attainment. 
Given the strong association between fund leakages and lower learning outcomes, my analysis 
explores what this realistically could mean for the trajectory of a child’s life into adulthood. I find that 
decreased educational attainment is likely to lead to an increase of racial inequality, greater difficulty 
entering university, and greater difficulty to seek returns to education vis-à-vis employment 
opportunities. With Brazil’s shifting economy demands in favor of higher analytical skills, children 
studying in the presence of corruption are at risk. It is my hope that this thesis contributes to a greater 
body of research demonstrating that corruption in education deters countries from developing the skills 
and talents of its citizens. Not only does this have negative effects for individuals in securing their 
rights to education, but failing to educate a population will unlikely sustain the economic work force 
demands of a country. Consequently, Brazil’s education policy must change. I argue that current 
monitoring groups are ineffective in deterring fund leakages and offer policy recommendations to 
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promote information gathering, a strong anti-corruption group, and public engagement. Education is a 
means to help children develop to their fullest potential. As shown in this thesis, corruption in 
education poses a threat to this development. For the future well-being of children and the nations they 
































APPENDIX 1) ABBREVIATIONS 56  
 
 
CACS: Accompaniment and Social Control Council (Conselho de Acompanhamento e Controle Social 
do FUNDEB) 
 
CGU: Controller General of the Union (Controladoria-Geral da União, CGU) 
 
CRC: Convention on the Rights of the Child 
 
FUNDEB: Fund for the Maintenance and Development of Basic Education and Valuing of Education 
Professionals (Fundo de Manutenção e Desenvolvimento da Educação Básica e de Valorização dos 
Profissionais da Educação) 
 
FUNDEF: Fund of Maintenance and Development of Basic Education and the Valorization of the 
Magistrate (Fundo de Manutenção e Desenvolvimento do Ensino Fundamental e da Valorização dos 
Profissionais da Educação) 
 
GDP: Gross Domestic Product 
 
HDI: Human Development Index 
 
IIEP: International Institute for Educational Planning 
 
IBED: Index of Basic Education and Development (Índice de Desenvolvimento da Educação Básica) 
 
IBGE: Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística) 
 
INEP: National Institute of Educational Studies and Searches (Instituto Nacional de Estudos e 
Pesquisas Educacionais Anísio Texixeira) 
 
ICESCR: International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
 
LDB: Law of Directives and Bases (Lei de Diretrizes e Bases da Educação)  
 
MEC: Ministry of Education (Ministerio da Educação)  
 
OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development  
 
PISA: Programme for International Student Assessment 
 
PNAD: National Household Sample Survey (Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios)  
 
                                                
56 Author’s note: All abbreviations are based on the language they originated from. This means all sources coming from 
Brazil will be referenced as they would in Brazilian Portuguese. For those in Portuguese I will include my own English 
translation where applicable.  
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PT: Worker’s Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores)  
 
TI: Transparency International  
 
UNDP: United Nations Development Programme 
 
UNESCO: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
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